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The Problem of Wartime Currency Control
The requirement for effective management of the total
resources available for successful accomplishment of any given
task is an accepted fact of our time. Indeed, considerable
effort is devoted to the continual refinement in methods of
management and to increasing the sophistication of those who
would aspire to positions of leadership in the field of manage-
ment. However, the universal excellence of management that can
be taken for granted today was apparently not so universal and
not so excellent just over twenty-five years ago in the special
field of wartime currency control.
During and immediately following V/orld War II, local
currency was used wherever possible as the medium of exchange
for the United States and Allied Forces in occupation areas,
YJhere this was not feasible, spearhead, supplemental or military
currencies were used. Under these procedures, special
administrative regulations, including currency control books,
were employed with minimal success in reducing the impact of
Allied occupation forces' spending on local economies.

2Mindful of the need to maintain or restore economic
order in war- torn areas, to Isolate Allied military personnel
from illegal markets, and to preclude the accumulation of local
currencies in official accounts, the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers, Europe, and the War Department initiated the Military
Payment Certificate system in September, 194-6.
The accumulation of local currencies in official
accounts, primarily by United States personnel in Germany, was
done through black market operations. The Americans in occupied
Germany found themselves in a very enviable position of being
monopolistic suppliers of the luxuries of life to a war ravaged
population. The British had very little to sell; the French had
nothing. The Americans had the Post Exchanges and commissaries
with their unlimited stock to use in making great profits in the
black market.
For the American black market to be successful there had
to be two other elements—customers with plenty of cash, and the
opportunity to convert profits into American dollars and other
valuable assets. Both elements were available in the United
States 2 one of Germany and in the City of Berlin which was
jointly controlled by the four allies.
Black market customers were Russians, Germans and the
great masses of displaced persons. The Russians wanted mainly
whiskey, watches and cameras; the Germans and the refugees wanted
food and cigarettes. All of these people had money in quantity,
especially the Russians who were supplied ample amounts of the

3Allied occupation cu: y, the Allied Military ISark, by their
own authorities
.
For some time after the end of the war, there was no
restraint on the black market activities of United States
personnel in Germany. However, these activities and the
attendant profits attracted attention and the need for corrective
action was seen, especially since the drain on the Army's
financial resources became a serious and rapidly growing deficit.
It became apparent that this deficit was caused by the black
marketers. As the black market profits remitted to the United
States exceeded the amount of money appropriated by Congress for
pay and allowances, the excess remittances were paid out of the
United States Treasury at the expense of the American taxpayer.
Since the War Department was finally accountable to Congress,
the need for immediate corrective action to ward off a potential
o
political explosion was obvious.
Therefore, the rapid accumulation of local currencies in
official accounts was one reason to seek a more successful
method of currency control.
An additional fact to be considered at the close of the
Second World War was the strength of the United States dollar in
comparison to other currencies of the world. The appearance of
dollars in large quantities circulating freely would have
*Vladimir Petrov, Eonej^and__Gon^UBpt (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1967), pi 205.
2Ibid.

4undesirable effects during this period.
In the Second World War the Armed Services, in their
conduct of the war, had occasion to handle a total of $11
billion in foreign exchange transactions. The result of these
transactions resulted in the accumulation of $380 million in
excess of the dollars appropriated for the various purposes by
Congress. Of this amount, $250 million were in German marks,
$75 million were in Japanese yen, and the balance in various
currencies.
At present, Military Payment Certificates are used in
overseas areas where the use of American dollars is not
considered advisable by the United States or where the host
government will not permit the use of American dollars by United
States forces in the area for a number of reasons, including
the fear of the impact on their economies of freely circulating
American dollars.
It is also toward the avoidance of repeating previous
errors in currency control that this thesis is directed. There
were several attempts made and several devices used by the
United States to develop a satisfactory method of currency
control during and after World War II.
-*-U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Armed Services and Banking and Currency, Occupation Ourrer
33ESSsactlfiLS§.» Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations,
Armed Services, and Banking and Currency, Senate, 80 th Cong.,
1st sess. , 1947, p. 3.

The Purpose of This Thesis
In light of the foregoing, the principal, endeavor of
this paper will be to establish a basis whereby It can be
determined if use by the United States of Military Payment
Certificates to provide a measure of currency control during
and after World War II achieved the results desired by those
who prescribed their use.
Additionally, this thesis will seek to set forth the
results originally desired by the use of Military Payment
Certificates and to provide an indication as to the value of
their continued use in the world of today.
Further, this thesis will seek to provide an indication
of the consequences of completely eliminating the use of
Military Payment Certificates or of at least restricting their
use to combat zones as they occur in time to come as well as
the gold flow Implications of either course of action by the
United States in the conduct of future combat operations.
The use of Military Payment Certificates at present
occurs in only four countries. They are, for the most part,
widely separated geographically as well as politically. The four
countries are Lybia, Japan, South Korea and South Viet Nam.
The Scope of Research
In order to facilitate the formulation of logical and
accurate conclusions concerning the value in past, present a?ad
future use of Military Payment Certificates, research in this
area will be made of available military and financial histories,

6personal interviews, and government documents and periodicals.
The writer has had first-hand experience in actual
handling of Military Payment Certificates in Japan and South
Viet Nam while on active duty in the United States Wavy as a
shipboard disbursing officer. The experience has been of a
continuing nature since 1955.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF MILITARY PAYMENT CERTIFICATES
Effective and efficient management of available
resources, men, money and materials, is of paramount importance
to the economic well-being of any company, industry or country.
While this is axiomatic and is the subject of considerable
attention during normal times or under controlled conditions,
it assumes a position of primary importance in wartime and is
vital to the survival of a country during wartime. Successful
currency control in wartime has come to be most important, but
this was not always the case as recently as twenty-five years
ago. At this time the United States had had very little
experience in currency control problems of the magnitude that
were to be faced in the final years of Y/orld War II and during
the subsequent years of postwar reconstruction in which the
United States would play so large a part.
The Necessity, for. Currency Control
and Historical"" Prece dents
The provision for effective currency control in those
areas occupied or liberated, as the case may be, is of utmost
importance to the continuing success of the occupying or
liberating forces. Lack of effective control and coordination

8between military and civil authorities may have a deleterious
effect on plans for currency conversion designed to impede
inflation, to correct budget deficiencies and to confiscate
hoards of money of questionable legality in the hands of the
indigenous population which may have been acquired by
collaboration with the enemy or through black market operations.
It is to be recalled at this point that black market operations
in the closing years of World War II and the immediately
subsequent postwar years were regarded as especially harmful to
the local economy in much the same manner as excess inflation is
regarded as a menace today
„
The black market operations in Germany would grow after
the end. of the war and huge profits would be made. This, coupled
with the remittance privileges of United States personnel in
Germany, would eventually lead to a serious drain on the United
States Treasury and corrective action would become necessary.
This was later to be seen as a major problem facing the United
States in the postwar years.
The practice of issuing occupation currency and the
counterfeiting of enemy currency has, as such, had many
precedents in history. In fact, a variety of currency devices
have been used in support of military operations over the
centuries. In about 1122, during the siege of Tyre, Doge Xlicheli
paid his troops in leather money, promising redemption in regular
"Frank A. Southard, Jr., The_.JPinances oXJEurpjsejan
£^§£§^25 (Mew York: King's Crown Press, ~1956") , pT~12~.

9currency upon the return to Venice of his army. The British
resorted to the counterfeiting of enemy currency during the
American Revolution. This is rendered somewhat humorous by the
fact that the American Continental Congress issued currency of
its own prior to the issuance of the Declaration of Independence.
This actually could have been considered occupation currency,
depending upon the point of view of the observer. General
William T. Sherman of the Union Army is said to have resorted to
the ungentlemanly act of counterfeiting the currency of the
South during his march through Georgia toward the sea. Napoleon
likewise resorted to the counterfeiting of enemy currency during
his Austrian and Russian campaigns. Frederick the Great even
went so far as to capture enemy dies from which he had made and
issued degraded coins. The French finished the printing of some
Reichsbank notes in process and subsequently issued them when
they occupied the Ruhr in 1923.
During the Seven Weeks War between Prussia and Austria,
Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and certain minor German states in
1866, receipts for requisitioned goods were commonly used as
legal tender; a similar practice was used by the Germans during
the Franco -Prussian War of 1870-1871. The British went still
a bit further and made receipts against such material readily
negotiable during the Boer War of 1899-1902. During the Russo-
Japanese War of 1905, the Japanese issued special occupation
currency in Korea and Manchuria. The wide-spread acceptability
of this currency in those areas was brought about by the
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Japanese encouragement of local Chinese civil authorities. The
Germans and the Austrians issued occupation currency during the
First World War, as did the British in their occupation of
Archangel during and after the same war.
Currency Control in the Second
World War by Germany
Relative to the mechanics of currency control, there
need be no substantial difference between liberated and enemy
areas in regard to the currency arrangements which the invading
forces may be able to make. In either case, liberating allied
territory or occupying enemy territory, the object is the
same— that is, to ensure the availability of the currency and
the credit required by the invading forces. In all cases it is
most desirable to obtain ready access to the treasury or the
central bank of the territory involved and to secure through
agreement with allies, or through force in occupied territory,
the desired currency and credit resources for use by the
2invading forces.
The German authorities, in their typical thoroughness
and attention to detail, anticipated the problem of currency
control in the areas to bo occupied by their forces at the
outset of their various geographical endeavors. They took the
necessary action to facilitate the orderly acquisition of the
U . S
.
, Congress, S ena te , c cup a. tion _Currency Trans -
§S.^i,Q^S.> HGarA?i£§.» PP e 76-77.
2Southard, Liberation, p. 12.
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required amounts of currency and credit required to support
their forces.
The Germans successfully used a variety of occupation
currencies in the Second World War and used them on a large
scale. Upon entering an area the currency initially used by the
Germans in most instances was the Reichskredltkasse mark, a
paper currency printed in German and denominated in German
monetary units. This currency circulated concurrently with the
local currency at German decreed rates of exchange. Both
currencies had the status of legal tender at the time of the
decree.
The German Reichskredltkasse mark, however, was not
legal tender within Germany. Its use was usually a tempors/ry
measure and as local conditions permitted, the Reichskredltkasse
mark was withdrawn in favor of a type of currency which was more
familiar, and hence more acceptable, to the local population.
In some Instances, as in Denmark and France, the currency used
was genuine local currency issued by the preoccupation government
and reissued by the Nazi-dominated government of the occupied
territory. In other instances, a local currency identical to
the preoccupation currency but reproduced by a Quisling govern-
ment was used under direction of the German occupation authority.
In still other instances a new currency denominated in
preoccupation units was issued and used or an entirely new local
currency denominated in terms of a new unit was issued and used.
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In those areas actually incorporated into the Reich, the regular
German currency of the day replaced both the Reichskreditkasse
and the local currency.
The Germans were better able to implement their various
credit and currency control efforts than the Allies were due to
their good fortune in securing early control over the capital
cities of the nations which fell victim to the advancing German
armies. This was the case in the German occupation of such
countries as Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and
Denmark. And, having gained control of the central bank or
treasury of those countries, the Germans were better able to
take prompt action to replace whatever spearhead, or provisional
currencies that they had issued with a currency that was more
familiar and acceptable to the local populations. 2
Ii§y^3gLAllied Experiences
The Allies were not so fortunate as the Germans had
been in this respect. Access to Rome and Berlin did not prove
to be a simple matter and this tended to complicate matters over
the long term. However, there was a practical difference
between liberated allied areas and occupied enemy areas from the
point of view of the Allies. The Allies could be reasonably
sure, based upon experiences in North Africa and in Sicily, that
the retreating Germans would adopt currency policies intended to
^•U. S. f Congress, Senate, Occupation Currency Trans-
:





2Southard, L^exation, p. 12.
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disrupt local affairs and to impede the advance of the Allies.
To further compound the difficulties of maintaining law and
order on the part of the Allies, the retreating Germans used
what appeared to be opposite actions in Tunisia and Sicily. In
the former area, the Germans circulated large and excessive
quantities of Bank of Prance notes, increased several times over
the wage rates to certain classes of employees, patronized the
local black market openly and freely and paid collaborationists
handsomely.-*- In short, the Germans created an inflationary
situation for the Allies to cope with. It was necessary for the
restored authority, the French-African Government, to call in
the notes more or less dumped by the Germans against a limited
exchange for Bank of Algiers notes. This action enabled the
government to have an administrative device with which to
scrutinize questionable profits in the hands of possible
collaborators and black market operators and to counteract the
inflationary conditions created by the Germans.
At the other extreme in Sicily, the Germans provided
an equally unmanageable situation by completely opposite tactics.
There, for some months prior to the Allied invasion and
occupation, local Italian currency had become progressively more
scarce. This was a deliberate and intentional government policy
planned to reduce to an absolute minimum the volume of currency.




This was successful to the extent that even ordinary commercial
activities became almost impossible. Local banks were ordered
by Mussolini to destroy by burning on hand stocks of currency
prior to the arrival of Allied troops. 1 While the order was not
completely executed, the intended damage was done to the Allied
cause and the Germans were successful in their efforts to create
maximum dissention in areas that they were forced to evacuate.
While the Germans were successful at first glance in
creating chaos in their wake, so too were the Allies equally
successful and resourceful in employing effective countermeasures
to neutralize the efforts of the Germans. In Tunisia, the
availability of Bank of Algiers notes provided a medium with
which to stabilize the situation. These notes were readily
acceptable locally. In Sicily, the feasibility of the use of
Allied Military Currency was demonstrated and its fortunate
2
availability provided the solution to the problem at hand.
Therefore, based on these experiences the Allies could
and did ultimately make maximum use of the advantages afforded
them by the existence of numerous recognized Governments -in-
Exile.
Among the advantages available to both the. Allies and
the various governments-in-exile afforded by their cooperation
in currency control matters were the reduction of confusion as to
the responsibility for the issue of the currency, for overall
1Ibld .
2Ikii. » p. 82 -
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policy related to the currency and for ultimate control of the
currency. The central government assumes full responsibility




So far the facts collected herein have shown that in
practice the use of wartime or occupation currency is in complete
accord with historical precedent* Indeed, its use is vital to
the successful prosecution of the war effort and to the economic
well-being of those nations that would endeavor to profit by
military action against their neighbors or in self defense and
in the attempted restoration of the previous order. In accepting
the historical precedent and recognizing the economic need to
achieve the necessary currency and credit resources required to
support the efforts of the nation involved in military operations,
the various currency instruments used during and after the
Second World War by the Allies will be examined.
The first type of currency to be examined is what was
known as Spearhead currency. As the name implies, it was the
currency carried into the area to be occupied at the time of
invasion by the invading forces. The ideal situation would
obviously be to have available adequate stocks of the local
currency for use by the invading forces. Usually this was not
the case because one country just does not have another country's
currency on hand in such quantities. The British took a very
^Southard, Ifib^ration, p. 13.
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large, but inadequate for future use, supply of Italian lire
into Sicily in July of 194-3. Thin currency had fallen into the
hands of the British in Italian Africa, but not in sufficient
quantities to support their subsequent operations in Sicily.
Therefore, a type of spearhead currency was used until local
currencies or supplemental military currencies came available.-
The United States used as spearhead currency in this
area regular silver certificates. In order to differentiate
these spearhead silver certificates from United States currency
already in the area and from United States currency possibly
distributed by the retreating Germans, the seal on the
certificates was printed in yellow. A .similar device was used
in Hawaii by the United States in the days when Japanese
invasion of the islands was considered a possibility. Regular
United States currency was overprinted with the word "Hawaii 11 as
a protection against its later use by the Japanese against the
United States. This currency was subsequently used for
occupation purposes in certain areas of the Pacific Theatre in
much the same, fashion as the yellow seal certificates were used
in the Mediterranean Theatre.^
A second type of currency used in invaded areas is, of
course, local currency then circulating in the area. This







use as legal tender. Occasionally, local currency is printed
and Issued by a government-ln-exile for use in the contested
area in anticipation of the imminent restoration of the regular
government and their resumption of such responsibilities. On
occasion, this currency was supplemented by the use of spearhead
currencies. Due to the availability of adequate quantities of
local currencies in V/estern Europe, spearhead currencies were
not used there.
A third type to be examined is military currency. This
currency is ordinarily intended to supplement a local currency
when it is issued, not to replace or supersede the local currency.
i
There were two notable exceptions to this intent,
however. One exception occurred when the British Military
Authority issued lire in Trepolitania to replace the Italian lire
for various political and financial reasons. The other exception
occurred when the Allied Military schilling was issued in
Austria to replace the Reiehsmark. This proved to be an Interim
measure pending issuance of a new national schilling by the
restored government
.
In view of the shortage previously noted of Italian lire
in the hands of the British in the Sicily operation in July of
1943, the first military currency was issued by the Allies at
that time. The notes were conservative in style and of a




convenient size by present-day standards. They were lithographed
by the photo offset process in the United States to be issued in
Sicily.
Unfortunately, the style and size of these notes were
such that their reproduction presented no challenge to local
counterfeiters, who appear to be quite numerous in that part of
Italy.
Two other military currencies were used by the Allies
in Europe . They were the Allied Military mark in Germany and the
Allied Military schilling in Austria, as previously noted.
Of interest is the fact that none of the Allied Military
currencies used during this period contain anywhere on them a
promise to pay. In fact, no responsibility of any kind is
indicated on these notes. Only the authority Issuing the
currency is shown.
The final type to be examined is the one time use of non-
military supplemental currency in France. There had been
negotiations among the Allies and the French provisional govern-
ment seeking to obtain acceptance and backing of this currency
by that government upon its assuming its rightful position in
p
France. In the meantime, the currency was in use by Allied
forces in the area.
Eventually, the French provisional government acceded to
the desires of the Allies and what could have been an
glbid ., p. 16.
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embarrassing financial crisis was averted.
The reason for not using regular currency of the
invading country is obvious and it is to guard against the
possibility of the enemy obtaining quantities of the currency of
the invader in the event of military reverses on the field of
battle.
The Problem .Facing the
n-
Unl ted .States
It correctly can be assumed from the foregoing that the
United States actually had little or no consistency or logic in
its effort to achieve and maintain an effective currency control
program at the time of entry of its forces into the Mediterranean
and European Theatres of the Second Y/orld Vfar. It appears that
there was not established an effective decision-making process
at the required level in the hierarchy of war planning, and this
was compounded by the absence of centralized responsibility for
currency control.^-
A major problem to be faced in whatever currency control
measures were adopted was the exchange of currency in the hands
of United States personnel for remittance to the United States.
That is, United States personnel were allowed the use of
currency exchange facilities, usually Array Finance Offices and
the malls, to remit funds to the United States. Therefore, the
V/alter Rundel, Jr., Bla^k_JIarJcejt^pjaey (Louisiana
State University Press, 1964), p. 31.
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United States had a vital interest in assuring itself that only
an amount of currency that it had assumed responsibility for
would be exchanged and remitted to the United States. The ideal
situation was that there would not be exchanged more foreign
currency into United States dollar credits, and eventually
currency, than United States personnel in the area had received
as pay and allovxances.
While the War Department apparently chose not to concern
itself with the consequences of an Ineffective currency control
policy, other governmental agencies were concerned and did
anticipate the seriousness of the problem.
Por one, the Treasury Department inquired of the Army
as to the direction of its fiscal plans for occupied areas in
the course of the war and in the postwar recovery period. The
Army's reply was that there would be little or no problem and
that no stringent currency controls would be required. Further,
the Army expressed the opinion that its military personnel
savings program would provide the necessary relief of any
occupation currency control requirements.
One wonders at the naivete of this type of thinking on
the part of the Army at this time, especially in light of the
given situation of the possibility for profit via the inevitable
1Ibld .
2Ibid., p. 32, citing Minutes of Meeting in the office
of John J. Me Cloy, Assistant Secretary of War, April 8, 1944,
World War II Records Division.
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black market, of the area of United States' operations in Europe,
and of the basic trait of Yankee ingenuity for making a fast
dollar when provided the opportunity. One further wonders along
these same lines today, twenty odd years later, relevant to
operations on the opposite side of the world. Only now the
earning rate is ten per cent for savings so deposited as compared
to four per cent in the Second World War.
The Army further stated to inquiries as to the nature of
its intended course of action in the field of currency control
that the matter was under study, especially the matter of
remittance procedures, and that the requirement to review control
measures in effect possibly existed. Whatever the outcome of
such studies, their results are yet to be realized in corrective
action taken.
Actually, it appears that the War Department's studies
of currency control during the war never did provide a workable
solution to those problems during that time. By concentrating
its efforts on investigating the various instances and types of
violations of remittance regulations, the War Department never
brought itself to the core problem of protecting the United
States Government and its taxpayers from those persons who could
and would remit these ill-gotten gains to the United States for
conversion into dollars through official channels. Short of
facing the actual basic problem, the investigation and strict
regulation of all currency transmission channels would have
^-Ibid ., p. 32.
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lessened the problem somewhat."
Also of importance in this matter was the attitude and
practice of those who were in a position to exercise a measure
of control in the amount of currency transmitted to the United
States. At this time a certification of authorization for
transmitting funds had to be signed by an officer of the rank of
major or above. Not only was this regulation demoralizing to the
troops* it overlooked the possibility that certain officer ranks
could be involved in questionable currency practices. The
result in field operation practice was that all amounts of
currency submitted for authorization for transmittal were duly
certified by appropriate unit commanders as just and proper. In
most instances the size of the largest amounts were also
certified to be gambling winnings and therefore legitimately
eligible for transmission to the United States. As an example of
the magnitude of the problem to be faced, the transmission of the
largest single personal transfer of funds up to December, 194-5?
2
was in the amount of $23,000.
A Side Light
There occurred during this time an event of the most
extreme magnitude in the effort to control currency operations,
an event that could have been interpreted as a signal of the
events to follow over the years in the relations between the soon
1 Ibid.
2Jl.bM • » P« 58, citing "Report of Operations," Berlin
District, January-March, 1946, p. 7, Federal Records Center.
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to be' victorious Allies. While the long range effects may not
have been as serious as the effects of other events that would
follow over the years, they were of importance in the area of
finance. This event was the making available to the Russians a
set of the engraving plates with which the Allies intended to
print Allied Military marks for use as occupation currency in
Germany against the time that the Allies would, in fact, oecupy
that country.
There was a combined United States -United Kingdom
decision early in 1944 that an occupation currency patterned
after the German mark would be printed and issued by all of the
Allies for use in Germany. These marks would be used by the
combined military forces for expenditures within Germany by the
occupation forces.-** The agreed purpose of this plan to use the
same Allied Military mark in all zones of occupied Germany was
to enable that country, through the early establishment of a
stabilized economy, to rebound as an economic unit. In this
manner, Germany could contribute to the restoration of economic
equilibrium in a democratized postwar Europe.
The world. has had ample demonstration of the true desires
and intentions of Russians as far as a united Germany and a
democratized Europe are concerned in the past twenty odd years.





''"""'r ' ' ' }>-i'w, po 15 •
%undel t Black Market Money, p. 41.
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However, at the time the possibility of ensuing events happening
as they have, rather than as the Western Allies envisioned post-
war conditions would be, was not widely considered at that time.
Indeed, had the Western Allies excluded the Russians from their
currency plans and thereby encouraged then to use an occupation
currency of their own issue, this uould have constituted an
agreement in advance to create exactly what was not at all wantod
but, unfortunately, came to be»^ At no time did the Allies
agree to an arrangement whereby Germany would be permanently
divided.
The Allied Military marks to be used in Germany were to
be printed in the United States by the Treasury Department, and
in January of 1944, the design work was begun. At no time was
there the slightest official suspicion that the Russians were
going to prove uncooperative. In fact, the assumption by the
United States and the United Kingdom was that all who wore to
have access to the use and distribution of the marks would be
2
ethical in their use of the marks.
In the next month, the Russians first began their
efforts to obtain a set of the engraving plates with which to
print their own supply of marks for use by their troops. ^ After
several months of negotiations, the Russian government sent a
note to the United States on April 8, 1944, stating that if a set
3-U. S,, Congress, Senate, ^^j^a^o^Ourrjancy^.^^an^i
^£M^ns, Hearings, p. 15.




of engraving plates were not made available to thern, they would
be compelled to take stops on their own to provide themselves
with occupation currency to be used in Germany.
The British government supported the Russians in their
demand for a set of the engraving plates, which, in hindsight,
seems curious in view of the widely held opinion that the British
often saw the Russians in their true light where the United
States did not. However, in response to the repeated demands of
the Russians and in view of the support of the British, the
plates were made available to them on April 18, 1944, based on
a decision made by the State and Treasury Departments.
On that date the plates, inks and paper necessary to
print Allied Military marks were delivered to Washington National
Airport by the Bureau of Printing and Engraving for further
transfer to the Russians. Five Russian airplanes were loaded
with this material and departed Washington for Moscow by tray of
Siberia. 2
It is interesting to note, at this point, the names of
some of the individuals who were instrumental in bringing about
the transfer to the Russians of the engraving plates for the
Allied Military marks. Dr. Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the
Secretary of the Treasury, was one of the negotiators of that
department and, as such, advised the then Secretary? Henry
Morganthau, Jr. He was subsequently accused by Whittaker
^•U. S., Congress, Senate, Occupation Currency Trans-
S£iiP-SE» Hearings . pp. 16-17.
^Rundel, Black
m
Marke t Mone y, p. 43, citing memo from
Secretary Morganthau to the Ambassador of the USSR, August 14,
1944, VJorld War II Records Division.
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Chambers of knowingly aiding tho Russian Communists and some of
his writing for them was found among the famous "Pumpkin Papers."
General George C. Marshall, speaking for the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, agreed to the transfer with the provision that the action
was not to interfere with any existing plans of General Eisen-
hower. The only opposition, on record, came from tho Director
of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, A. Y7. Hall, and his
opposition was based on the absence of any exact accounting
procedures to be used by the Russians in the use of the marks to
be printed with the plates.
A little over a year later, it became apparent that the
Russians were flooding Germany with marks that they had printed
from the plates given them by the United States. Russian
finance officers were distributing marks freely and with no
record of accountability. It was said that the Russian soldiers
were issued Allied Military marks with their rations, and on
2
occasion made gifts of them to their American counterparts.
The consequences of this situation where money was
almost free wore staggering to consider. In July of 194-5, the
garrison in the United States 1 zone of Berlin was paid $1,000,000,
Three times that amount was remitted to the United States, the
difference representing Allied Military marks and other currency
which had been acquired by American troops and subsequently






converted to dollars.'"' This conversion was a drain on the United
States Treasury to the extent that the money converted to dollars
exceeded the amount of money appropriated by Congress for
military pay and allowances. It was a cost to the American
taxpayer.
In describing the results of the major attempt at
currency control in Europe, and especially in Germany, to this
point, it is well to recall the social and economic climate in
much of Europe at this time. There were various reasons
accounting for the breakdown in social order and the rise in
black market operations throughout Europe. The essential causes
were the collapse of morale on the part of the local populations
and the tempting possibilities of the large and easy profits to
be made, a,s well as wartime shortages and the disruption of
normal trade. Further, the Americans had a surplus of all types
of supplies and quantities of dollars which could be used to
obtain huge profits. The exchange tended to involve the usual
cigarettes, coffee, sugar, chocolate, dollars and some Army
property on the part of the Americans for jewelry, cameras, art
objects and local currency on the part of the Europeans.
There are two principal reasons for the failure of the
Army's currency control in Europe. First, a realistic and
'Oliver J. Frederiksen, The__American Military
Occupation of Germany 194-5~1953. Historical Division, Head-
quarters", United States Army, Hurope, 1955 (Dormstadt, Germany:




consistent currency control program was not planned prior to
beginning European operations, and, second, once involved in
actual operations on the continent it was unable to develop a
workable program.
Currency Control in Asia
The currency control situation in Asia was considerably
different from that which developed in Europe as the war
progressed toward final settlement. While most of the problems
in Europe resulted from the inadequacies of policies conceived
during the war and not improved during the beginning of the
occupation, this was not the ease in Asia.
As the war in Asia drew to a conclusion, it came to be
that the United States would bo the primary, and ultimately the
only, Allied nation to occupy Japan. This would seem to present
an ideal opportunity for the Army to redeem itself in. its
administration of currency control in Japan. The occupation of
Japan began a few months after the end of hostilities in Europe
and the wild currency gyrations that had beset that area. But,
even with the recent events in Europe, the Army had not
capitalized on its experiences and practically duplicated its
errors in Japan.
^
The Army had prepared itself for the unknowns in the









Shikoku and Kyushu by obtaining a supplemental type currency,
type "B" military yzn* There was found to be a sufficient
quantity of Imperial yen available, however, thus avoiding the
currency shortages experienced in Italy and Africa. The
military yon was circulated on an equal basis, as required,
1
with the existing supply of Imperial yen.
Currency control under these conditions only became a
problem as the need to redeploy troops arose. An initial guide-
line was adopted whereby each person was allowed to convert
$150 from yen into dollars as he was to depart the area. In
some instances, of course, there were those who had funds in
excess of the stipulated allowance. To the extent that they
could prove the legitimacy of ownership they were allowed to
convert. The exchange was usually on a cash basis, but where
dollars were in short supply, postal money orders, savings
deposits and personal transfer accounts were legally used.
2
The certification by personnel officers of the
legitimacy of funds submitted for conversion into dollar credits
was the foundation on which the Pacific command built its
currency control program for Japan, Korea and Okinawa. This
system was thought to be necessary by the command in view of
the fact that Imperial yen was circulating in the military
•'Ibid,., p. 62, citing Circular 67, General Headquarters,
U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific, September 10, 1945, World War
II Records Division.
^!kM« » V* 63 1 citing Commander-in-Chief , Army Forces in
the Pacific *to Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific




establishment on an equal basis with type "B" yen in order to
prevent large amounts of black market yen from being converted
into dollar credits. *• However, the personnel officer's
certification was the tic.'' link in the control system.
The key to currency control in Japan was to be the
certification system whereby local personnel officers would
attest to the propriety of each submission of funds for remittance
to the United States. It was assumed by the Pacific Command of
the Army that this arrangement would prevent yon holdings
resulting from illegal black market operations from entering the
system and being converted into dollars or dollar credits.
Questionable submissions were forwarded to the next higher level
in the chain of command for a decision. This, along with the
degree of discretion allowed the individual personnel officers,
comprised the fatal flaw in the currency control program in
Japan. The events of the European experience were soon to be
repeated.
Late in 1945, there had developed in Japan a black
market of immense proportions in American goods. This eventually
defeated the existing currency control program. The impetus to
the development of the black market in Japan was the unfavorable
official rate of exchange between the yen and the dollar which
overvalued the yen. This fact stimulated the American service-
man to seek redress in any way available to him, usually the
^bid., p. 63.
It>M,» s PP. 63-64, citing Commander-in-Chief , Army
Forces in the Pacific to Commanding General, Sixth Army, et al.,




selling, illegally, of his equipment and of merchandise acquired
at reasonable prices in post exchanges and resalable in the black
market at considerable profit. Also, at that time, yen could
legally be spent in the post exchanges which provided an enter-
prising serviceman a very real opportunity to generate huge
personal profits. In this same year the Pacific Command
converted yen to dollars for remittance to the United States and
ended the year with an overdraft amounting to about $75,000,000
in yen.
When the conversion of ail foreign currencies stopped
late in 1946, the United States had $380,000,000 in excess
holdings of such currency. Of this amount, $250,000,000 was in
marks, $75,000,000 was in yen, and the remainder in various
other currencies.
^
There were no major currency control problems in other
areas of Asia because Americans had usually been paid in dollars.
This is not to say that black markets did not exist, but the
problem of currency control did not arise in those areas.
Currency ,_ Control Books
Ho attempt at wartime currency control by the Allies and
the United States had worked very well during the Second World
War. Of course, the business of currency control was somewhat
^*lM4 e » PP» 64-66, citing Major General Richards to the
Secretary of War, April 22, 1947, World War XI Records Division.
2u. S., Congress, Senate, Occupation Currency Trans-
actions. Hearings , p. 3.
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different from the point of view of the United States than from
that of the other Allied pouors. The prime consideration
concerned the actual presence of the dollar in the various local
economies. And, this restriction placed on the United States by-
other countries was for a very good reason. Most of the countries
of Europe had boon touched by the war. Certainly the effects
and dislocations of the war were felt all over the continent and
were manifest in the weak economies in and around that area.
For the most part, the actual presence of the dollar in the hands
of American troops and in the hands of the local populations was
not welcome * The dollar was probably the strongest monetary unit
in the world and its presence tended to disrupt those economies
in vfhich it appeared.
The United States dollar was, of course, the universal
monetary unit; it could be spent anywhere for anything and was
regarded almost the same as gold. While other currencies would
circulate with the dollar at the same time, the dollar would
according to G-resham's Law, be hoarded while the intrinsically
cheaper currency circulated. Thus, large quantities of dollars
would be stashed away all over Europe to be brought forward by
many people for redemption by the United States in later times.
Who would venture to predict when or under what conditions this
might happen? Who could predict the consequences of this action
on the economic stability of the United States at that unknown
time? Therefore, in most all instances the dollar was not the
best currency to use in the Second World YJar.
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On the other hand, allowing the unlimited conversion by-
American servicemen of any and all wartime currencies into
dollars for transmission to the United States was not a tolerable
condition either. Ho matter how the American serviceman came
to possess the currency, legally or illegally, the unlimited
conversion into dollars was a bill to be paid ultimately by the
American taxpayer. There had to be a way to counteract this
situation, and the certification procedures by senior officers
and personnel officers clearly had not worked.
As a result of much study of the currency problem, the
War Department, through the Office of the Fiscal Director,
recommended that a currency control method using currency control
books be considered with a view toward its adoption and use.
This was in the spring of 1945, and by mid-summer their use was
planned for implementation before the end of that summer.
In practice, the currency control books would work in
the following way. Each of the over throe million American
servicemen overseas would be issued a currency control book to be
kept by him at all times in much the same manner as his military
identification and shot record are kept individually today. As
each serviceman in an overseas area drew pay and allowances due
him, that amount was to be entered in his book by the paying
office. As foreign local currency was used by the serviceman,
deductions would be entered in his book. The principle in
issuing the currency control book was to limit the maximum amount
of money available to the individual serviceman for conversion
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into dollars and subsequent transmission to the united States
of that amount drawn by him in pay and allowances. It would also
serve to shew the exact amount of money that an individual should
have in his possession at any given time. Currency control books
were finally made effective as of November 10, 1945 in Europe,
and on February 10, 1946 in the Mediterranean theater.
That the use of currency control books was doomed to
moral and administrative failure should have been foreseen by
those responsible for the implementation of their use. But, it
is difficult to evaluate foresight from a position of hindsight.
The books were of very simple format which made easy the
efforts of those who would falsify entries or counterfeit the
books. Also, the currency control books were not serially
numbered as are such documents as identification cards today.
This lack of accounting procedures enabled some servicemen to
have several books at the same time. While the legitimacy of
the previous certification procedure by unit commanders and
personnel officers had been made casually and had doomed that
system, the same attitude was found to exist among those who
were responsible for making currency control book entries.
And, as always in the military services, there are those
who for one reason or another can always find compelling reasons
for their exclusion from the requirements of any mile or
regulation. In this case, and at that time in 194-5, there were
considerable force redeployments in process and those so Involved
were excluded from the provisions of the currency control book
regulations. The results of this are obvious.
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Houever, the most decisive blow to any possible success
of the currency control book effort was dealt it by the theatre
and operating commanders. For some unknown reason, probably
based on indecision, the impending implementation of the use of
currency control books was widely announced some two months in
advance. The results of this mistake can be correctly surmised.
The Berlin district made disbursements in the amount of
#2, 570, 921.32 in October, 194-5. In the same month it collected
through finance offices, Army post offices, exchanges and quarter-
master sales stores an amount of $8,226,461.73 ia Allied marks.
The requirement to use currency control books in the
European theatre was made effective finally on November 10, 1945,
and in the Mediterranean theatre the following February.
This action did not solve the problem of the conversion
of black market profits into dollar credits for transmission to
the United States. In February, 1946, American military personnel
in the European theatre drew §25,218,344.16 in cash and in the
same month returned, through official channels, $35,183,221.20
in Allied marks for conversion and remittance. In March of the
same year the amounts were $21,826,216 and $36,482,480.
Obviously the problem had not been solved through the use of
currency control books and the overriding laxness in enforcement
of currency control measures insured failure of the program.
Late in 1946, various levels of command in the European
theatre began to enforce the more stringent aspects of currency
control. Inspections were made on an unannounced basis and
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excess or illegal funds were confiscated. This action gave the
impression that currency control would continue permanently along
the same lines as in the past and drew attention away from the
new currency control effort, the introduction and conversion to
a scrip system,"
And so j, the introduction and use of the Military Payment
Certificate^ as known today, finally came about. The Army was
designated as the Executive Agent to supervise the issuance of
and regulations pertaining to the Military Payment Certificates.^
Table 1 shows the places and periods of use of Military
Payment Certificates since their introduction on September 16,




2Personal interview with E. L. Jordan, Head, Disbursing
Systems Branch, Office of the Comptroller of the Navy,































































































August 31, 196 5-s till in use
Source: Personal interview with G. P. Nichols, Deputy
Director for Banking and Finance, Office of the Secretary of

















September 1, 1946-March 10, 1947
March 10, 1947-March 22, 1947
March 22, 1948-June 20, 1951
June 20, 1951-May 25, 1954
May 25, 1954-May 27, 1958
May 27, 1958-May 26, 1961
May 26, 1961-January 6, 1964
January 6, 1964-
August 30, 1965-Octobcr 21, 1968
October 21, 1968-
Source: Personal interview with G. P. Nichols, Deputy
Director for Banking and Finance, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Y/ashlngton, D. C, October, 1968.
aThe digits 461 indicate the first series used in 1946;
471 indicate the first series used in 1947. After 1947, this
distinction was no longer vised.
^Two series are currently in use.

CHAPTER III
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY
PAYMENT CER TIF IOA TBS
The Way to Currency Control
After nearly five years experience in various attempts
to achieve an acceptable degree of currency control within the
Armed Services, the use of the device of scrip, the Military
Payment Certificate, was finally decided upon. It was brought
about by the repeated insistence of the Treasury Department
rather than by the War Department, an unfortunate fact.
Early in 1946, Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury,
proposed to the War Department that the use of scrip be adopted
in combination with various local currencies throughout the
military establishment „ The proposal went so for as to disregard
the legal entitlement of the serviceman to payment in dollar
credits, to allow him to obtain only enough currency to pay for
his immediate personal needs on the local economy, and to
absolutely prohibit reconversion into dollar credits.
Further, the Secretary expressed the annoyance of his
Department with the War Department for its apparent total





For many months the Treasury Department . . .
has been attempting with the greatest seriousness
to induce the War Department to adopt measures
which would prevent the conversion into dollars of
foreign currencies acquired illegally or through
unauthorized channels. These attempts by the
Treasury Department have not met with success. . . .
There has been no serious attempt by the War Depart-
ment to investigate cases of Army personnel who
acquire personal fortunes during the course of the
military operations. . . . Vie are not even
currently informed of the situation at any given
time since the War Department has not or cannot
obtain through its ordinary procedures significant
statistics as to the amounts involved in its
foreign exchange operations.
This situation is considered to be one of
greatest gravity. The inability of the United
States Army to prevent the conversion into dollars
of foreign currencies acquired by personnel through
unauthorized channels, and the unwillingness of the
War Department to impose effective controls which
the Treasury has in the past suggested, has resulted in
a serious worsening of the situation and the Treasury
now feels it necessary to propose a more drastic
measure, which would render unnecessary and thus
eliminate the Army's conversion system.-*-
The War Department i?as quick to react to this criticism
and began to take corrective action. However, the War Department
chose not to mention the joint circulation and interchangeability
of scrip and local currency envisioned by the Treasury Department
in its implementing correspondence. Instead, the War Department
emphasized the non-acceptance of scrip from other than authorized
personnel and the non-reconversion of local currencies into
dollar credits for transmission to the United States. In this
manner the Army would have the long sought check device to insure
^Rundcl, B3 ; o.y- J'.- -)-r-.-i ; t ov, ; - y- f p # QXj quoting Fred M.
Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury, to the Secretary of War,
February 10, 1946, World War II Records Division.
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that only money disbursed by the Army would be collected through
the various facilities such as finance offices, post offices and
exchanges by the Army. An additional feature of the use of scrip
was that it was intended to be of little value to members of the
local population and would help to reduce black market operations.
This unique and desirable feature would be brought about by
announcing that the scrip would be Issued by series and that the
existing series could be recalled at any time and a new series
issued. All United States personnel would be allowed conversion
privileges without question up to a specified sum. Amounts
submitted for conversion in excess of that amount would be
investigated. The single most desirable feature was that there
would be no more $380,000,000 excesses requiring explanations
by the Army.
The American efforts toward currency control had come
about as a result of its having incurred rather embarrassing
deficits. The deficits had been caused by the lack of a well-
planned currency control program with the necessary centralized
authority to enforce the program.
An Asid e
As is so often the case in the comparison of the day to
day practices of the United States with those of its former
enemies, the Germans and the Japanese, their practices look more
•'"U. S., Congress, Senate, Occupation Currency Trans-
§^'l2M§.t KejgL^nj££.» p. 3.
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efficient but were harshly imposed on subjugated nations, while
the United States has usually achieved results without the
harshness. So it was with the use of scrip in the German and
Japanese currency control programs.
The Germans issued the same non~convertible type
currency to all its occupation troops. The currency circulated
with the local currency at a rate of exchange prescribed by the
Germans and was legal tender in only that particular occupied
country in which it was issued. The currency had to be spent in
the country of issue, or its value was forfeited upon transfer
by the individual soldier. This currency was known as
Reichskreditkassenschine, which meant Reich credit treasury
notes. Another device used was a type of currency that was used
when large numbers of troops were to be transferred to another
country. The Reichskreditkassenschine held by the troops was
converted into another type of military currency, the
Verrechmmgss chine , This word has no literal translation, but
means roughly credit notes or payment orders. This currency was
not legal in Germany or in any occupied country, but was converted
into the local currency or Reichskreditkassenschine upon arrival
in another country. Aside from maintaining the desired degree of
currency control, the Germans, by using these devices , were able
to transfer to the occupied country the cost of the German
occupation of that country. 1
•^Ibid., p. 82, citing Hans J. Dernburg, "Currency
Techniques in Military Operations," April 11, 1945 , Federal
Records Center; Prank A. Southard, Jr. to Fiscal Director,
May 31, 1945, (Memo), G-5/123.9, Federal Records Center.
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Tho Japanese used an equally effective means to gain
currency control with a military scrip system. They Issued in
the various countries and areas which were occupied by their
forces a military scrip which was denominated in the local
monetary unit and backed by the Bank of Japan. This scrip
circulated interchangeably with existing local currency. When
the Japanese authorities considered the occupation to have
stabilized, all circulating currency was called in and exchanged
for a new military scrip denominated in yen. In this manner all
occupied areas were incorporated into the jen block with all
currency clearing being done in Tokyo."
I
Py^_^l^lvaluatlon
At this point it is interesting to consider and to
wonder at the success that the United States might have had in
maintaining currency control had it adopted a program similar to
either of the foregoing. With the great quantity of desirable
items that the Americans deem necessities and take with them
everywhere, there no doubt would have been a black market problem
wherever they went. This would, it seems, have had an effect on
the success of any program used. On the other hand, would the
casual approach actually used by the United States have worked
toward the desired goal of currency control in the absence of
such seemingly unending quantities of material wealth which was
so available to those who would engage in black market
•'-Ibid., p, 83, citing Henry Simon Block and Bert P.





activities? Would the German and the Japanese programs have
been so successful if such material wealth had been available to
would-be black market operators? Available evidence seems to
indicate that the results achieved by the Allies and the United
States were indeed successful, and in the final analysis, more
equitable in their currency control efforts.
While admitting to certain criticisms, it can be said
that Allied currency policy in Europe was in some respects
successful. First, this policy met the major needs of the Allies
in every area that large scale operations were conducted by the
making available of the required amounts of currency and the
making of satisfactory arrangements with local financial and
government authorities conducive to the successful prosecution
of the war effort. Second, this policy was further able to meet
the currency needs of each and every country and locality where
normal authority had ceased to function by providing the required
currency supplies. Third, wherever the use of military
currencies was resorted to, the procedure was justified, based
on historical precedent. Fourth, no economy subject to Allied
or United States control was disrupted by the use of such
military currency. Fifth, and finally, whatever financial or
currency arrangements were used by the Allies were the result of
agreement reached through negotiations with the local or affected
government. Criticisms of the policy would include those directed
toward the use of Allied Military marks in Germany and the use
of the supplemental franc in France.
^Southard, Lyieration, pp. 55-59.
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The situation in Japan was more conducive to the
successful use of scrip. The United States was the major
occupying power in Japan. Type "B" yen, as previously described,
was used until July 19, 1946. At that time type "A" yen was
issued. It would be the only currency to circulate within
official channels and would be the only currency used officially.
At conversion time, finance officers would issue type "A" yen
for Imperial yen, but would not later reconvert indigenous yen
back into dollar credits or type "A" yen. The new type "A" yen
was an immediate success in stopping the conversion of black
market profits into dollar credits. The Army was the only source
of the typo "A" yen and was collecting only that amount Issued
through official channels, thereby practically precluding the
occurrence of an overdraft unfavorable to the United States.
^
Formal Beginning;
Based on the success with military scrip as shown by the
use of type "A" yen t the feasibility of the world-wide use of
scrip was demonstrated. Accordingly, conversion dates, better
known as C-days, were set by the War Department for all theatres.
The date for the European and the Mediterranean theatres was
scheduled to occur between September 10 and September 20, 1946,
"Rundel, iB^ck
-
Jtoj^it^oney., pp. 85-86, citing
"Administrative History, Office of" the Fiscal Director," General
Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific, April 6, 1945
to December 31, 1946.
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and the date for the Pacific theatre between September 20 and
September 30, 1946.
Production of military payment certificates was approved
In June, 1946, and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing began the
designing and printing of the now currency. The certificates
to be issued were all paper bills and were in the following
denominations: $10.00, $5. 00, $1.00, $.50, $.25, §.10 and $.05.
These certificates were to have full dollar backing and therefore
had to be of the same high quality as United States bills in
order to make them equally as difficult to counterfeit. Toward
tills end, several unique features were incorporated in their
manufacture such as colored disks, or spots, appear in the paper
used, special inks were used and special type serial numbers
which were difficult to reproduce were used. The illustrations
appearing on the various certificates are all allegorical In
nature, they do not have any current significance and they do not
represent any real living or dead persons. Each likeness shown
on these certificates is an Imaginary creation produced by the
artists employed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and no
live models are used in their design and creation. Extreme care
is exercised in this entire process to insure that the various
series of Military Payment Certificates axe distinguishable,





^Personal interview with R. Shepherd, Fiscal Officer,
Finance Services Office, Comptroller of the Army, Office of the




In this fashion the Military Payment Certificate came
into everyday use in September, 1946, and has continued in use
ever since.
The Military Payment Certificate system, then, could be
called a system of "canteen money" and is similar to one used by
the Germans in the Balkans during the Second World War. It has
been said that this type of currency represents the belated
recognition of the fact that in an invasion or occupation, there
are three separate foreign exchange areas involved. The areas
are: the invaded country, the home country, and the military
community c Transactions between the three areas must be
controlled effectively if the foreign exchange reserves of any
one of them are not to be unnecessarily depleted*
The introduction of the Military Payment Certificate
never stopped the participation of United States personnel in
the various local black markets, but it did increase the
difficulty with which profits in the black markets were converted
into dollars. Therefore, the main accomplishment of the Military
Payment Certificate reform was that essentially it stopped the
increase in troop pay overdraft.
^Petrov, Money and, Cong ue_s t , pp. 215-16,

CHAPTER IV
THE MILITARY PAYMENT CERTIFICATE IN THE WORLD TODAY
Does It Meet, the Nee d Today?
Today the Military Payment Certificate is used in four
areas --Lybla, Japan, South Korea, and South Viet Nam.
The use of the Military Payment Certificate in Lybia is
based more on that country's desire to avoid the unrestricted
circulation of the United States dollar in its economy rather
than any need based on desires of the United States. As the
local currency becomes more firm in relation to other world
currencies, perhaps the Lybian government will relax its stand
and the Military Payment Certificate can be withdrawn from
use there.
Use of Military Payment Certificates in Japan appear to
be from force of habit more than from any requirement to protect
that economy from unres trie ted circulation of the dollar.
Indeed, only United States military personnel and certain other
authorized personnel in Japan are required to use the Military
^-Personal interview with G. F. Nichols, Deputy Director
for Banking and Finance, Office of the Secretary of Defense,






The official exchange rate imposed on these
personnel Is currently 260 yen to the dollar. American tourists
visiting Japan, in ever increasing numbers, can easily and
legally frequently obtain a more favorable rate in their currency
transactions. The use of the Military Payment Certificate could
probably be stopped in Japan at any time with no serious
consequences.
The continued use of the Military Payment Certificate in
South Korea is primarily dependent upon that country's economy
emerging as one able to stand alone in the world community of
nations without such stimulants as continued aid from the United
States. In view of world tensions, the free circulation of
dollars so close to an announced and demonstrated opponent of
the United States, North Korea, is to be avoided. Understandably,
this action does not preclude the acquisition of dollars by the
Worth Korean government, but it does not aid them in their
efforts either. Additionally, it aids in the control of black
market operations.^
The situation in South Viet Nam seems to be a sum of
all the reasons advanced in favor of the continued use of the
Military Payment Certificate. The Government of South Viet Nam
requests the use of the Military Payment Certificates in that it
is desirable to preclude the enemy's obtaining United States





the widespread black market operations. 1
At 7:09 A. M. on October 21, 1968, the Military Payment
Certificate series used in South Viet Nam was changed from series
64-1 to series 661. Speculators in the former series suffered
losses as a result of the conversion to the latter series.
While losses were thus encountered, those same speculators feel
that the next conversion will, of necessity, be some time in
the distant future, thereby insuring them of considerable time
to make up both their losses suffered as a result of the
conversion and to make even greater profits in the guaranteed
future operating period. 2
There were a number of stories circulating in Saigon
during this time concerning the effects of the conversion and
those who suddenly found themselves the holders of worthless
paper. This event, causing the loss of fortunes, was regarded
by some as a sort of Viet Names e Black Friday, and there were
instances of suicides. American officials estimated that of the
$4-9,000,000 of scrip circulating in Viet Nam, $2,000,000 to
$40,000,000 was illegally in the hands of Viet Namese citizens.
5
While it is illegal for authorized personnel to spend
scrip in the local economy in Viet Nam and it is illegal for the
J ib id .
2
"South Viet Nam, 0-Day," Time^Majgazine , November 1,
1968, p. 97A.
3Gene Roberts, "Money-Changers in Saigon Hit Hard,"
The New York Times c October 22, 1968, p. 8.
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Viet Namese to have scrip in their possession, it nevertheless
is a profitable business. Viet Namese who come into possession
of scrip sell the scrip for a five per cent profit to the illegal
money changers. The money changers then sell the scrip back to
Americans at a rate thirty-five per cent below face value for
United States dollars. They then sell the dollars to other Viet
Namese at a rate of more than two hundred piasters to the dollar.
The legal rate is one hundred eighteen to the dollar, thereby
giving a tidy profit to the seller. The dollars received by the
Viet Namese are subsequently deposited in foreign banks as a
hedge against an unfavorable peace settlement which may affect
the value of the postwar piaster. This illegal money changing
activity has undesirable effects on both the South Viet llamese
and American economies.^
In view of the foregoing, the claim can be made that the
Military Payment Certificate is the vehicle with which to
achieve the desired degree of currency control. Its use is
effective in preventing the repetition of the overdrafts which
occurred in the Second World War and which were such a discomfort
to the Army and the "War Department. This is a substantial
benefit and is well worth the average cost of conversion to a




Personal interview with G. P. Nichols, Deputy Director
for Banking and Finance, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C, February, 1969.
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An interesting aspect to the use of Military Payment
Certificates is that they, in effect, generate a slight amount
of profit. This comes about by the fact that each Military
Payment Certificate is backed by an equal dollar amount. As
the Military Payment Certificates are lost or destroyed while
in use, there can be no claim against that quantity of backing
dollars, and, hence, a profit to the Army, the managing service,
for the use of Military Payment Certificates. Also, those
Military Payment Certificates which ultimately end up in the
hands of unauthorized holders such as black market operators
result in a profit upon cancellation of a series of Military
Payment Certificates. Over the years since 194-6, this has
created a profit that amounts to about $800, 00Q. In fact, some
question has been raised as to the final disposition of this
so-called profit. One use would be to defray the cost of the
Military Payment Certificate program rather than through the
use of tax funds.
Should .the. Use be Changed?
The usefulness of the Military Payment Certificate might
well be limited, in the future, to combat areas such as South
Viet Nam. The international monetary situation of today is
vastly changed from what it was a little over twenty-five years
ago. There are numerous strong monetary units that compete
freely with the dollar in desirability the world over. There
is widespread talk of the need to overhaul the world monetary




that the major role of the Military Payment Certificate in the
future is that of a black market control device in future
combat zones e
Although the use of the Military Payment Certificate
has proven successful in many respects, it is the present policy
of the Department of Defense to reduce this use as the opportunity
to do so arises. Contrary to the foregoing, an additional
possible use of the Military Payment Certificate would seem to
be its use to pay forces stationed permanently in overseas axeas.
The advantage would be the avoidance of having to physically






In time of war, economic, as well as financial, chaos
can be assumed as certain to occur in combat areas. To the
extent that a nation at war can maintain a degree of economic
stability through a viable currency control program, its ability
to wage a successful wartime operation is enhanced.
The use of various currency devices as well as currency
control devices in wartime has historical precedents.
Thus, in the Second World War, the precedent of
currency control was a means of warfare available to all nations
engaged in that conflict. The Allies used a variety of currency
control devices during that war with varying degrees of success,
always the prime purpose being to ensure the availability of the
currency and credit required by the Invading forces to support
themselves. In all cases it is most desirable to obtain ready
access to the treasury or the central bank of the country
involved and to obtain through agreement with allies, or through
force in occupied areas, the desired currency and credit




The experience of the Allied Forces would prevent their
ready access to the sources of currency and credit In many areas,
and they would have to develop other means toward the desired
end of obtaining those resources.
The obvious reason for not using the regular currency
of the invading force in the process of liberation or occupation
is to prevent currency of the invading force from falling into
the hands of the enemy in the event of military reverses on the
field of battle.
An important purpose of currency control is to reduce
the possibility of individual profiting from illegal operations
in currency exchange transactions and in the ubiquitous black
market. This purpose is obtained by insuring that there be only
one source of supply and only one source for redemption of a type
of currency used in the area by the occupying forces. This was
only accomplished after the Second World War had ended by the
introduction and use of scrip in the form of the Military Payment
Certificate.
Prior to this event there was a period when considerable
profits were made by United States personnel in operations and
transactions of questionable legality. Also, it was a time
during which a wartime ally, Russia, chose to act contrary to
the best interests of any but her own. This was done by the
Russians 1 issuing Allied Military marks in unlimited quantities
without backing and for their own use in robbing Germany at the
ultimate expense of the American taxpayer.
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Also, during this period an attempt was made to achieve
a satisfactory degree of currency control through the use of
currency control books that were to be issued to some three
million servicemen to be used to account for funds in the hands
of all servicemen and other authorized personnel. That this
attempt failed further demonstrated the advantages and
desirability of an efficient scrip system.
The decision to begin the use of a scrip system was
brought about by severe criticism of the War Department by the
Secretary of the Treasury. This criticism was based on the
fact that all currency control efforts to date had but resulted
in an embarrassing deficit in the amount of some $380,000,000.
That the Axis powers appear to have been more successful
in their currency control efforts can be attributed to one
important fact, in the opinion of the writer. That fact is the
difference in the purposes of the Axis Powers and the Allied
Powers* On the one hand, there was the purpose to subjugate,
acquire and incorporate other nations; while on the other hand,
there was the purpose of preventing the Axis' success and the
restoration of order in the world. However, it appears that the
consensus of opinion accepts the conduct of the Allies in their
currency control efforts as equitable and just, if not totally
efficient.
Production of Military Payment Certificates was approved
in June, 1946, and they were placed in use in September, 1946.
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These certificates have full dollar backing and are the same
high quality product as regular United States currency. That
these certificates are in use today in four different areas of
the world attests to their success as an effective currency
control device and a deterrent to black market operations, and
uould appear to predict their continued use for that purpose.
An unanticipated benefit accruing from the use of
Military Payment Certificates has been the generation of a type
of profit resulting from physical loss or destruction of
Military Payment Certificates, thereby reducing eventual claim
against the dollar backing of the certificates which may or may
not be an actual physical quantity of dollars.
The Military Payment Certificate is now used in four
countries-»Lybia, Japan, South Korea and South Viet Nam. Its
use in Lybia is at the request of that government, and its use
in Japan is becoming more unnecessary as that country's economic
power increases. The use of the Military Payment Certificate
in South Korea is based on the desire of the United States to
aid that economy by restricting the circulation of dollars, to
control black market operations and to deny the Worth Korean
government a source of dollars for use against the United States
The Military Payment Certificate is used in South Viet Mam for
essentially the same purposes, but there black market control




The purpose of this paper has been to provide a basis,
through the accumulation of available pertinent information,
from which the use of Military Payment Certificates can be
evaluated and to determine whether the results achieved by their
use were the results desired.
Toward this end., the results originally desired by the
use of Military Payment Certificates must be shown. An assess-
ment of the role of the Military Payment Certificate in today's
world is logical and necessary, as well as inquiring into any
continuing need of them. Finally, assuming a continuing need,
should their use be increased or decreased?
In Chapter I, the discussion focused briefly on the
measure of wartime currency control which was intended to
maintain or restore economic order in war-torn areas, to isolate
Allied military personnel from illegal markets, and to preclude
the accumulation of local currencies in official accounts. The
purpose of this paper was stated to be that of evaluating the
use of the Military Payment Certificate in the past and future




Gold flow implications in the usg of Military Payment
Certificates is to be considered briefly. The scope of research
was stated as including available military and financial
histories, personal interviews and various government publica-
tions.
In Chapter II, the historical precedents of wartime
currency control were discussed at length in view of the need
for such controls during the Second World War. Comparisons were
made between currency control systems used by the Axis Powers
and the Allied Powers, and it was shown that while the Axis Powers
enjoyed certain strategic advantages in their efforts, the
Judgment of contemporary history would indicate that the currency
control action of the Allies was Just and equitable. Various
currency control devices used by the Allies, including currencies
and currency control books, were discussed and interpreted to
indicate that the scrip device, the Military Payment Certificate,
was the primary vehicle to achieve the desired results. The
principal results desired by use of the Military Payment
Certificate were to maintain maximum economic order in war- torn
areas by isolating Allied personnel spending from local
economies and to obstruot and prevent black market operations
which ultimately cost the United States* taxpayers enormous sums
of money.
In Chapter III, the pressure brought to bear on the War
Department by the Treasury Department bringing about the
implementation of the scrip system is discussed in the light of
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contemporary history, which regards the use of the Military
Payment Certificate a success.
In Chapter IV", the use of the Military Payment
Certificate in the world today is discussed. It can be shown
that the Military Payment Certificate is currently used to
protect the Lybian economy from freely circulating dollars spent
by American servicemen in that economy. It can be shown that
perhaps the Military Payment Certificate is no longer necessary
in Japan as that country's economy continues to grow and expand.
It can be shown that the use of the Military Payment Certificate
in South Korea is necessary to protect that economy from freely
circulating dollars spent by American servicemen, to prevent
black market operations, and to deny the North Koreans a source
of American dollars. It can be shown that the Military payment
Certificate in South Viet Nam is necessary to isolate the
American serviceman from black market operations primarily, as
well as to protect that economy from freely circulating dollars
and to deny the enemy access to dollars.
It appears from the evidence available that, indeed,
the Military Payment Certificate does have a place among the
tools of defense today. While the United States may or may not
choose to attempt to maintain world-wide economic stability in
I
times to come, and while it may or may not be desirable for the
United States to attempt to limit the world -wide flow of dollars,
it will probably always be to the advantage of the United States
to control black market activity wherever its forces operate.

61
Therein lies the essential feature of the Military Payment
Certificate, and based on the potency of that feature it can be
concluded that the Military Payment Certificate must be retained
for use j as a minimum, in current and future combat zones.
Admittedly, the Military Payment Certificate does not
completely preclude black market operations, but its use does
increase the hazards of that profession.
In consideration of the gold flow implications in the
use of the Military Payment Certificates, it further appears
that there is little or no problem in this respect and will
remain thus so long as tourist spending exceeds the spending of
military personnel, their dependents, and other authorized
personnel overseas.
A final thought concerning a benefit available from
expanding the use of the Military Payment Certificate is in order
The use of Military Payment Certificates to pay authorized
personnel overseas could reduce, in total, the number of actual
dollars in overseas areas as a result of permanently stationed
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